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1. Introduction  
 
In 1998, Lebanese President Elias Hrawi (Ilyās al-Harāwī) presented a draft law to establish a 
unified code for civil marriage in the country. The draft law was needed for a nation 
characterised by different personal status codes for its various communities (or groups of 
communities). The state recognises 15 different personal status codes prescribed by the 18 
legally accepted religious sects among the Lebanese population.1 The bill sought to regulate 
marriage matters that fell under the jurisdiction of religious courts2 but did not directly deal 
with other important issues such as divorce, alimony, inheritance rules and child custody. 
And yet, even though the draft law was optional, the religious elites firmly opposed it. 
Overall, however, Lebanese civil society reacted warmly to the draft law presentation.3 
Religious and political leaders presented themselves as custodians of the status quo, even 
though, at one point, the bill seemed to have support from a majority in Parliament. In the 
end, however, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri refused to allow parliamentary debate and put it 
up for a vote.4  
 
The civil marriage law, which complicates marriage between different 
confessions/communities and has spurred the so-called “wedding business”,5 touched on one 
of the pivotal issues for the “Lebanese system”, namely the regulation and consequent control 
of the lives of individuals belonging to different communities. In a broader sense, this bill 
concerned the equal treatment of Lebanese citizens before the law. Article 7 of the Lebanese 
constitution of 1926 states that “[a]ll Lebanese are equal before the law. They enjoy equal 
                                                
1  Farha. “Secularism in a Sectarian Society? The Divisive Drafting of the Lebanese Constitution of 1926”. 
In: Constitution Writing, Religion and Democracy. Asli Ü. Bali; Hanna Lerner (eds). Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 101–130. 
2  These tribunals vary from community to community but have the common characteristic of enjoying a 
great autonomy that, de facto, escapes control of the state’s judiciary bodies. The Lebanese Court of 
Cassation, Lebanon’s highest court, is the final arbiter of disputes and is responsible for examining the 
compatibility of religious codes with the public order. However, it has long interpreted this responsibility 
as being limited to examining jurisdictional and procedural rather than substantive religious rules.  
3  Despite awareness-raising campaigns in favour of the bill, civil society does not support the decree. One of 
the reasons may be the difficult post-war political situation and the fear of new sectarian clashes. 
4  See, for example, Kawas, Nafez. “Cabinet Backs Hrawi Civil Marriage Plan”. The Daily Star, 19 March 
1998. In: https://goo.gl/KpoAXB (accessed 25 October 2017). One of the motivations for Hariri’s decision 
was his desire to serve as the undisputed leader of Lebanese Sunnism, a task set up through a series of 
strategies that led him, in a few years, to personify Sunnism. In this new role, going against Sunni religious 
elites would certainly have been counter-productive. Cf. Meier, Daniel; Di Peri, Rosita. “The Sunni 
Community in Lebanon: From ‘Harirism’ to ‘Sheikhism’?”. In: Lebanon Facing the Arab Uprisings. 
Rosita Di Peri; Daniel Meier (eds). London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 35-53. 
5  This is similar to the situation in other countries in the region, such as Israel: Lebanese citizens of different 
faiths go abroad to get married. Upon their return, the Lebanese state recognises their marriage, which is 
then governed by the laws of the country where the marriage took place. This obviously creates many 
problems in the case of divorce and child custody because not only do the Lebanese courts and lawyers not 
know all the civil codes of the countries where the marriage took place, but state laws overlap and compete 
with those of the country where the marriage took place and those of the religious tribunals. Moreover, it is 
expensive to get married abroad, and not all couples can afford it, which results in further discrimination. 
See Casanova, José. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1994.  
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civil and political rights and assume obligations and public duties without any distinction 
between them.” But Article 9 of the same document seems to contradict this statement in 
practice when it asserts that “the personal status and religious interests of the population, 
whatever the religious sect to which they belong, shall be respected”.6 The absence of a 
unified personal status code leads Article 9 to extreme consequences, leaving the decision-
making process over crucial issues in the lives of individuals in the hands of religious courts 
and exacerbating the already deficient common legal culture. 
 
This religious prevalence (including that of the community), which found its legitimacy in the 
institutionalisation process of Lebanese communities in the 1900s,7 has created, over the 
years, a system of power that has increasingly aimed to exclude state sovereignty from 
specific areas. Moreover, the creation of autonomous spaces of power exempt from 
constitutional dictates and state laws has given religious leaders enormous decision-making 
(and contractual) power that has contributed to creating systems parallel to the state to 
manage individuals’ lives. This has major consequences, especially for women.  
 
Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to show that, despite the constitutional provisions that 
sanction the equality of all Lebanese, women’s rights in Lebanon are subject to different 
(social, religious and political) constraints. In a system characterised by a complex and often 
perverse interweaving of state norms, religious tribunals norms, society structure and politics, 
women’s rights have received little to no attention or protection. This is true not only for 
women who are nationals but even more so for all women who are not nationals: refugees 
(Palestinian, Syrian, Iraqi, etc.) and foreign workers (especially from East and South Asia). 
Although the status of the categories mentioned above is important to fully grasp the 
configuration of the Lebanese confessional system, that it is also a system of exclusion, the 
debate around non-national women’s rights is not included in this paper because the rights of 
non-nationals are contemplated neither in the constitution nor in the laws derived from it that 
are at the heart of this essay. The rights of non-nationals (women and men) are not a priority 
for the political and religious leaders, as is made clear by the fact that Lebanon has not signed 
several International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions regarding the regulation of 
migrant workers and the equal treatment of nationals and non-nationals in terms of social 
security: non-nationals, and especially women, are de facto almost nonexistent in the eyes of 
the Lebanese state.8 Consequently, despite its relevance, a serious discussion about the rights 
of non-nationals is a broader issue requiring ad hoc analysis of refugees’ and foreign 
workers’ rights and living conditions in Lebanon. It is a question that, also because of a lack 
of space, cannot be addressed in this paper.9  
 
                                                
6  Lebanon’s Constitution of 1926 with Amendments through 2004. Original version in Arabic. In: 
http://www.presidency.gov.lb/Arabic/LebaneseSystem/Documents/LebaneseConsitution.pdf, PDF file, 
(accessed 22 March 2018). English translation by Constitute Project. In: https://goo.gl/M7ReMB (accessed 
20 October 2017). This posture appears to run counter to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948, which affirms the equality of men and women and to which Lebanon specifically refers in the 
preamble to its constitution (point B). 
7  Cf. Di Peri, Rosita. Il Libano contemporaneo. Storia, Politica e Società. Roma, Carocci, 2017. 
8  For an analysis, see, for example, Picard, Elizabeth. The Arab Uprisings and Social Rights: Asian Migrant 
Workers in Lebanon, 2013. In: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00938259/document, PDF file 
(accessed 11 January 2018). In 2015, despite the difficulties they faced, domestic workers, with the help of 
the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Employees Union (FENASOL), launched the first 
domestic workers’ union of Lebanon. Cf. Massena, Florence. “Lebanese domestic workers to unionize”. Al 
Monitor, 15 May 2015 In: https://goo.gl/xQkkwk (accessed 11 January 2018). 
9  Cf. Hamill, Kathleen. Trafficking of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon, Kafa, March 2011. In: 
http://www.kafa.org.lb/StudiesPublicationPDF/PRpdf37.pdf, PDF file (accessed 11 January 2018). 
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To test our hypothesis, it is necessary to reflect on at least two points: first, the nature of the 
Lebanese context and how it has been configured, over time, as a patriarchal system where 
the dynamics of production and reproduction of power and control have been put in place 
leading to the inclusion or exclusion of certain groups or categories; and second, the close 
correlation between the religious and political spheres. In so doing, we will illustrate how 
such dynamics and relationships have in fact upheld and strengthened the patriarchal system 
by increasing the strong and pervasive control exercised over women within that system and 
society. 
 
The presence of differentiated personal status codes has not made it possible to promulgate 
laws that protect women’s rights within a common framework, and often the conservatism of 
the religious leaders, jealous of their power over the members of their communities, has gone 
hand in hand with a similar attitude on the part of political leaders, who are careful not to 
antagonise religious leaders. The latter are needed, among others, to ensure electoral 
consensus among the base. The result is a mutual reinforcement of the religious and political 
power that had a strong and negative impact on women’s status. Some examples make this 
point clearer. On the religious side, the fact that religious courts do not admit female judges 
(except for the Evangelical and Armenian Orthodox courts) helps us to understand how the 
system systematically excludes women from making key decisions regarding their status and 
their rights. As we noted before, it is the religious courts that make key decisions about 
women, such as those relating to marriage, divorce, child custody, alimony and so on. At the 
political level, not only is the political participation of women as both electors and candidates 
limited and included in the community and/or family channels, but also the rights of women 
have systematically received very little attention in terms of protection laws. For example, the 
law to Protect Women from Family Violence, drafted by the Kafa Women’s Rights 
Organisation in 2007, was approved in 2010, but with numerous amendments and cuts that 
altered its content and goals.10 According to the amended law, religious courts continue to 
prevail over civil courts; in addition, among other things it did not penalise rape as a crime if 
the act in question was committed by the victim’s husband.11  
 
From a methodological point of view, the paper is based on a series of interviews conducted 
in Lebanon between 2015 and 2017 with women holding various positions in political parties, 
in associations or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), at the universities (St. Joseph, 
Lebanese American University-LAU, American University of Beirut-AUB) in religious 
orders or as an election candidate. Informal talks with female activists were conducted in 
particular during their participation in public protests (not necessarily linked to women’s 
rights campaigns). Secondary sources, especially reports from the Lebanese associations 
working for the defence of women’s rights, as well as local and international press, have been 
taken into account. Without claiming to be exhaustive, the paper’s goal is to provide a useful 
contribution for further reflections. 
 
2. Building Consensus and Control  
 
Lebanon is a multi-confessional country marked by the presence of 18 communities 
recognised and protected by the state. These communities share political power according to 
                                                
10  See Kafa press release, “Cabinet Approves Law to Protect Women from Family Violence”. In: 
https://goo.gl/JTVmuN (accessed 21 October 2017). 
11  Interview of the author with a lawyer who is a member of Kafa, Beirut, 15 May 2015. 
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their demographic, social and historical weight.12 During the period of the birth and ascent of 
the emirate of Mount Lebanon (1586–1635) and with the systems of double qaimaqam 
(1842–1860)13 and of the mutasarrifiyya (1861–1915),14 the distribution of Lebanese space 
and society along communitarian/confessional lines created a pattern that had strong 
repercussions on the country’s development in later years and a robust impact on the 
development of the democratic fabric of political cultures. The invention of sectarianism was 
carried out through the so-called institutionalisation process of the communities, which has 
led to the development of the idea of the confessional management of society.15 This 
(political and social) process, legitimised by amendments to the 1926 Constitution, which had 
already provided for a communitarian power-sharing formula, has created a system of “social 
pluralism”.16 In such a system, which is typical of multi-communitarian societies, the 
divisions between communities have well-defined and demarcated borders, and individuals’ 
and groups’ prerogatives are reflected in the existence of specific communitarian institutions, 
such as religious tribunals and personal code laws. Even prior to the country’s independence, 
communities were called a “patriarchy” precisely to indicate the vertical management of 
power by a paterfamilias.17 
 
In Lebanon, communities are complex and non-monolithic entities: They vary in time and 
space and are not only physical but also mental “spaces” where religious, political and social 
dimensions coexist.18 The Arabic word ṭāʼifiyya, which is not easily translatable but is often 
translated with the incomplete and partial term of sectarianism,19 expresses the communities’ 
                                                
12  Among these, the most important were and continue to be the Maronite Christians and the Sunni Muslims. 
At the end of and following the civil war, the Shia Muslim community started to become more prominent: 
for the role that their militias played during the civil war, for their demographic rise and, politically, 
especially after Hezbollah’s creation in 1985, for the role of the “Party of God” in Lebanese political life 
from 1992 onwards. On the Lebanese confessional system and on the identity issue, see Beydoun, Ahmad. 
“A Note on Confessionalism”. In: Lebanon in Limbo: Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional 
Environment. Theodor Hanf; Nawaf Salam (eds), Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003, p. 75-
86, and Beydoun, Ahmad. “Lebanon’s sects and the difficult road to a unifying identity”. Beirut Review, 6, 
(1993), p. 15–21.  
13  The system of double qaimaqam was the first division of Lebanese territory along confessional lines. After 
the brief period of time during which Lebanon was under Egyptian control (1832–1840) and the Maronite 
Christian community assumed a new role, the Druze community (which, until then, had had access to 
power and privileges at the expense of other communities) pushed for a net territorial demarcation between 
them and the Maronites. This request led to the system of double qaimaqam that put the southern area 
under the control of the Druze and the northern area under the control of the Maronites. Dib, Boutrous. 
“Les deux Kaimakamiyas ou le dualisme druzo-maronite”. In: Histoire du Liban. Des origines au XXe 
siècle. Boutrous Dib (ed.). Paris, Editions Philippe Ray, 2006, p. 549-588.  
14  The regime of mutasarrifiyya was introduced to satisfy the European powers and the Ottoman Empire in 
1861. It was an administrative unit ruled by the mutasarrif, which was appointed by the Ottoman 
government and assisted in its functions through a representative assembly of the various groups present in 
the area according to a proportional breakdown on a confessional basis. From this moment on, community 
power sharing became the rule in Lebanon. See Farah, Caesar E. The Politics of Interventionism in 
Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–1861. London, I.B. Tauris, 1999. 
15  See Dagher, Georges. “Radicalisation de l’identité confessionnelle au Liban”. Cahiers de l’Orient, 61 
(2001), p. 131-141; Rabbath, Edmond. La formation historique du Liban politique et constitutionnel. 
Publications de l’Université Libanaise, Beirut, 1986.  
16  The institutionalisation process is a long historical process that led to the community settling on the 
Lebanese territory and their recognition by the central power. See Rondot, Pierre. Les communautés dans 
l’état libanaise. Cahiers de l’Association France Nouveau Liban, 4, Beyrouth, 1979. 
17  Rabbath. La formation historique du Liban politique et constitutionnel, p. 142. 
18  For a historiography of sectarianism, see Weiss, Max. “The Historiography of Sectarianism in Lebanon”. 
History Compass, 7, 1 (2009), p. 141-154. 
19  For a critique of this reading, see Mneimnehm, Hassan. “From Communitarism to Sectarianism: The 
Trajectory of Factionalism in the Arab Middle East”. The Muslim World, 106, 1 (2016), p. 62-82. For a 
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many facets very well. If the Lebanese recognise themselves as citizens with rights and duties 
towards the state, they establish close ties and relations with and devote themselves to their 
community. It is inside their communities that they solidify the relationships of trust and 
exchange of favours that often make the communities (and not the state) the point of 
reference for the Lebanese.20 Resolving personal and collective problems is accomplished by 
asking for the (religious or political) community leader to intercede in order to solve a 
problem in exchange for a vote or a favour.21 This practice led to the political and religious 
leaders’ goals converging, namely to maintain control over their members by keeping them 
connected to the community through religious rules and moral bonds.22  
 
One of the areas where this convergence was most evident is undoubtedly the one relating to 
personal status. The absence of a unified civil law has created systems parallel to those of the 
state that have produced pervasive control over the “communitarian individuals”, despite 
Decree 60 L.R. of 1936, which is currently in force and regulates matters relating to the 
freedom of belief. The decree guarantees not only the possibility for each Lebanese to choose 
their own personal status codes according to their religion but also to opt for a unified civil 
code disconnected from the laws on the personal status of various religious courts. In 
principle, this allows Lebanese citizens to join a religion that does not have laws on personal 
status or not to affiliate with any confession.23 By virtue of this decree in April 2013, a couple 
was able to have a non-religious, secret wedding in Lebanon in late 2012 and to remove their 
religious affiliation from the civil registers before getting married in front of a notary. The 
couple’s argument was based on the fact that Decree 60 L.R. had never been abrogated and in 
fact provided for a unified, albeit optional, civil code. On paper, there is an opportunity to opt 
for a civil code; it was the Lebanese state that, negligently, had not legislated on it for all 
these years.24  
 
It should also be noted that the Lebanese parliament’s recognition of the personal status codes 
of the various communities has had very different iterations (and outcomes) that in almost all 
cases have gone in the direction of a weakening of state power.25 This is a problem not only 
                                                                                                                                                  
debate of the changing meanings of ṭā’ifiyya, see, among others, Haddad, Fanar. “Sectarianism and Its 
Discontents in the Study of the Middle East”. The Middle East Journal, 71, 3 (2017), p. 363-382, and 
Makdisi, Ussama. The Culture of Sectarianism. Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century 
Ottoman Lebanon. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2000. 
20  See the studies on Lebanese trust in state institutions and data from the Arab Barometer. Kahi, Abdo; 
Khoury, Joseph; Kiwan, Fady. “Démocratie, bien commun et liberté. Que veulent aujourd’hui les 
Libanais?”. In: La construction démocratique au Liban, Antoine Nasri Messarra (ed.). Beirut, Lebanese 
Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace, Librairie Orientale, 1994, p. 59-77. Arab Barometer Survey 
Project, Lebanon Report. In: www.arabbarometer.org (accessed 29 October 2017). 
21  Interview with a Lebanese leftist activist, Beirut, 14 June 2017. See also Joseph, Suad. “The 
Public/Private: The Imagined Boundary in the Imagined Nation/State/Community: The Lebanese case”, 
Feminist Review, 57, 1 (1997), p. 73-92. 
22  Bourdieu, Pierre. Le sens pratique. Paris, Minuit, 1980. 
23  Di Peri, Il Libano contemporaneo, p. 34. 
24  IHEU, Lebanon’s first civil marriage divides the country, inspires calls for reform, IHEU 07/03/2013. In: 
https://goo.gl/E59OVv (accessed 19 March 2018). The reactions to this act were significant. Among 
others, Grand Muftī Qabbānī decreed that Muslims who marry non-Muslims no longer have to be 
considered true Muslims. See Meguerditchian, Van. “Qabbani Describes Civil Marriage as ‘Germ’”. The 
Daily Star, 29 January 2013. In: https://goo.gl/Xt7Uvx and Makhlouf, Youmna. “Civil Marriage in 
Lebanon: Fighting the State from within its Borders”. The Legal Agenda, 6 September 2016. In: 
https://goo.gl/G9VH6W (both accessed 16 October 2017).  
25  Although parliamentary approval for the Christian and Jewish communities has taken place, it has never 
been ascertained whether these laws comply with the laws of the state and the constitution (although they 
continue to be used). See al-Bilānī, Bišār Al Qawānīn al Mita‘aš šaḫṣiyya fī Lubnān (Personal Status Laws 
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because these codes, without parliamentary passage, may be in obvious violation of 
constitutional laws and constraints, but also and above all because in order to regulate matters 
of relevance to personal status, religious courts use, in addition to laws and jurisprudence, a 
set of unwritten rules related to confession and practice that make the landscape very 
complicated.26 Of course, the various confessions/communities are very jealous of their 
autonomy in this regard. 
 
Against the narrative that tends to describe Lebanon as a country characterised only by 
sectarian clashes and always on the brink of civil war,27 the reflection on personal status 
allows us to show how the problem does not appear to be confessional fragmentation but 
rather the will of the sectarian leaders (religious and political) to maintain a system that 
protects anachronistic privileges and ensures pervasive control over the lives of individuals. 
If such a vision of Lebanese society has long been blurred by other readings preoccupied with 
the quasi-democratic nature of the Lebanese context (in other words, the notion of 
consociative democracy in the post-war period, from 1989 onwards), various analyses have 
highlighted the highly oppressive and hegemonic nature of this context.28 Building on a non-
essentialist perspective and looking at communities as complex, real and symbolic places 
where various techniques of domination and control are produced and perpetuated, this line 
of studies has highlighted the deep contradictions in a country where the existence of multiple 
parallel systems can call the state’s authority and sovereignty into question. Maintaining this 
system has had two important outcomes: the first is that, given its configuration, the system 
has favoured the perpetuation of patriarchal dynamics; the second, as a direct consequence of 
the first, is that, in order to perpetuate this structure, the system has systematically ignored the 
rights and prerogatives of the group that is most affected by a patriarchal system – women. 
 
3. The Deep Ties between the Consociative, Confessional and Patriarchal Systems 
 
Various systems coexist and interweave on different levels in Lebanon. One level is political. 
It consists of the so-called consociative model. A second level is confessional, namely the 
religious belonging of the individuals and the religious norms at play in each community. A 
third level is the patron-client relation where patronage relations and the power of the 
community leaders or bosses, the zuama, prevail.29 A brief description of the different 
dimensions will help to gain a better understanding of how they are intertwined and why this 
intertwining ultimately has a negative effect on the rights of Lebanese women.  
                                                                                                                                                  
in Lebanon). Beirut, Dār al-‘Ilm li-l-Malāyīn, 1982, p. 2. Muslim communities’ codes have not received 
parliamentary passage. In 2011, however, the Sunnis approved a New Code of Family Provisions – the 
first and only codification of Sunni personal status law in Lebanon since the Ottoman family law of 1917 
and it is still in place. 
26  There are different bodies for each confession or aggregation of confessions. They were created by 
parliamentary laws with the aim of representing their confessions, overseeing their affairs and defending 
their rights and privileges. There are many problems with these bodies, not the least of which is the fact 
that the judges do not receive adequate training and therefore do not have the necessary competencies to 
deal with the various cases. See Human Rights Watch, Unequal and Unprotected. Women’s Rights under 
Lebanese Personal Status Laws. New York, Human Rights Watch, 2015.  
27  For a critique of this narrative after the end of the civil war, see Trombetta, Lorenzo. “Le Liban, entre 
révoltes arabes et conflit syrien: un exercice de flexibilité”. Oriente Moderno, 94, 2 (2014), p. 317-334. 
28  Salloukh, Bassel, et alii. The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon. London, Pluto Press, 2015; 
Melani, Cammett. Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon. Ithaca and New 
York, Cornell University Press, 2014.  
29  Another dimension, one that is often neglected in the analysis of Lebanon, is a class dimension that is 
transversal to the abovementioned levels. See Traboulsi, Fawwaz. A History of Modern Lebanon. London, 
Pluto Press, 2007. 
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Starting from the dimension of the consociative nature of the Lebanese political system, it 
should be noted that, on paper, it is a system that protects minorities and their prerogatives. 
The consociative model focuses on the role of the elite in “fragmented societies” and 
emphasises the importance of the agreed division of the political power between the different 
segments (in Lebanon, the communities) of society. According to the consociative model, the 
divisions in society tend to balance out when they are transversal, whereas they tend to cause 
conflict if they are mutually reinforced. The role of the elite is fundamental in this case, as it 
is up to them to moderate or exacerbate the conflict.30 In addition to the elite’s convergent 
and “preventive” behaviour (their ability to recognise the inherent dangers in a fragmented 
political culture, a wish to transcend cultural divisions, at least in terms of management 
groups, an ability to come up with appropriate solutions to the questions posed by existing 
sub-cultures), Lijphart, the main theorist of the consociative model, considers four main 
features:31 1) the presence of a grand coalition in power; 2) minorities’ mutual right to veto; 
3) proportional representation; and 4) cultural independence granted to the different 
segments. Lebanon appears very close to the consociative model between its independence 
(1943) and the outbreak of the civil war (1975). Starting with the National Pact of 1943,32 
Lebanon was governed by grand coalitions in which the country’s main communities had 
proportional representation. Members of Parliament were elected by adopting the 
proportional method and scrapping constituencies. The division of constituencies, however, 
in fact determined the need for a candidate to receive not only the vote of those belonging to 
his confession to be elected but also the vote of other communities. This would have favoured 
the search for a compromise and the openness of every community to each other.  
 
Another aspect distinguishing the consociative system in the First Republic (1943–75) was 
the relative cultural autonomy granted to the communities. Lebanon’s communities enjoyed 
real independence in all issues concerning their personal status, religious aspects and, in part, 
assets. 
 
After the end of the civil war (1989–90), in what some authors call the Second Republic, 
some of the aspects mentioned above came to an end, and the system became more rigid and 
less inclined to compromise. In this context, the last aspect, namely the communities’ 
autonomy, remained unchanged.33 This leads us to the second level, the confessional one. 
Lebanese communities, or communities’ aggregations, have precise rules for the lives of their 
members coming from religious tribunals that have civil powers, since there is no unified 
civil code in Lebanon to regulate matters relating to personal status, such as the transmission 
of citizenship, marriage, inheritance, child protection, adoption, divorce, etc. If, according to 
the rules of the consociative model, this autonomy is “necessary” for the model to avoid 
friction between communities or community groups, the inability to overcome this 
segmentation has gradually led to an anachronistic and paradoxical situation in which 
religious leaders have gained more and more power to regulate the lives of individuals by 
escaping control of the state. To legitimise this pervasiveness, Article 95 of the Lebanese 
Constitution states the proportional sub-division of the political and administrative roles 
                                                
30 Lijphart, Arend. “Consociational Democracy”. World Politics, 21, 2 (1969), p. 207-225. 
31  Lijphart, Arend. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1977. 
32  An unwritten agreement between the two main communities at that time, the Sunni and the Maronite, that 
institutionalised consociativism and confessionalism. 
33  See, for example, Di Peri, Rosita. “Il modello della democrazia consociativa e la sua applicazione al caso 
libanese”. Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 2 (2010), p. 1-31. 
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between the communities, which institutionalised the confessional system. Even though one 
paragraph in the same article explicitly states that “[t]he tasks of this [transitional] Committee 
shall be to study and propose the means to ensure the abolition of confessionalism, propose 
them to the Chamber of Deputies and to the Ministers council of ministers [sic], and to follow 
up the execution of the transitional plan”,34 the system is still alive. Not only that – the 
strengthening of the prerogatives of the religious authorities went hand in hand with an 
overall deterioration of the conditions that had allowed the consociative model to work, albeit 
with many gaps, before the civil war broke out.35 
 
The third level we consider is that of large families and community leaders who have a 
crucial weight in Lebanese life. Without falling into the essentialist trap that sees the 
traditional societies, where family relationships have a crucial weight, as backward, it should 
be stressed how the role of families in Lebanon was and is pivotal in many aspects. First, 
over the years, great families have created recognised and recognisable “political dynasties” 
that can hand over power from father to son (and, only in very rare cases, from father to 
daughter, but never from mother to daughter) and have dominated the political scene for 
decades.36 Consider the names on the election posters from independence to understand this 
pervasive presence. Second, the ties within the great families have fuelled the patriarchal 
system that, as was said in the opening, permeates the communities. Even in this case, the 
electoral lists have interesting elements, such as the predominance of male names.37 Female 
political participation has been hampered by various factors that can also be found in the deep 
interweaving among the various levels we are describing. A female candidate in the last 
municipal elections in 2016 told us how, before she started running, she had to meet with all 
the men in her family to announce her candidacy and her intentions and, in some way, get 
their approval. She said, in order to be a candidate, she had no other option than to work 
within the patriarchal system.38 There are very few women in Lebanese politics – not just as a 
deputies and ministers but also in the top positions of the various political parties.39 Since 
1952, only nine women have served as ministers. At present, there are only four women 
among the 128 members of the Lebanese Parliament, and three of them are relatives of 
former leaders and/or intellectuals and former deputies who died prematurely or were in 
prison.40 Nevertheless, in order to invert this situation, the virtuous examples and the 
                                                
34  Lebanon’s Constitution of 1926 with Amendments through 2004. English translation by Constitute Project. 
In: https://goo.gl/M7ReMB (accessed 20 October 2017). 
35  In the post-war period, Lebanon was submitted to the so-called Syrian protectorate: Syria’s pervasive 
presence in the country’s political life. Moreover, the sporadic search for compromise and the fear of new 
clashes led to a new power-sharing agreement between the three main institutions of the State, the troika, 
which with the crossed veto system paralysed the decision-making process. See, among others, Kassir, 
Samir. “A Polity in an Uncertain Regional Environment”. In: Lebanon in Limbo, p. 87-107. 
36  Joseph, Suad. “Political familism in Lebanon”. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 636, 1 (2011), p. 150-163. See also Vloeberghs, Ward. “Dynamiques dynastiques au Liban: 
transmettre le pouvoir politique en famille”. Critique Internationale, 4, 73 (2016) p. 71-93. 
37  During the 2016 municipal elections, more candidates were women than men. Women account for 53% of 
the voters in Lebanon. 
38  Interview by the author with a political activist, Beirut, 14 June 2017. Another element is tied to class and 
income. Everyone who wants to be a candidate must pay $5,000. Women often find it more difficult to get 
support and pay this amount, especially because they are in a male family environment that does not see 
the need for a woman to make the effort.  
39  Interview by the author with a representative of the Lebanese Forces, Beirut, 16 June 2017. As some 
interviewees have pointed out, there is also the problem of a male chauvinist political culture: often in 
parliament, in political parties etc., officials are not accustomed to dealing with a woman covering key 
positions, and women struggle daily to be accepted on their merits. 
40  See Alami, Mona. “Parliamentary Presence Sticking Point for Lebanon's Women”. Al Monitor, 19 March 
2015. In: https://goo.gl/wJpvnW (accessed 31 October 2017).  
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commitment of the various political parties but also of civil society activists have been very 
strong in recent years.41 However, as some interviewees pointed out, women in politics often 
do not want to be identified as just women’s rights paladins – they do not want to be 
ghettoised in that specific context.42 This is the reason why, for example, female deputies or 
female members of political parties do not specifically insist on/fight in favour of promoting 
women’s rights.  
 
Therefore, family ties and the pervasiveness of blood bonds are important not only because 
they allow large families to accumulate political capital to fuel clientelistic networks but, 
above all, because these ties strengthen the patriarchal system. The patriarchal system is 
pervasive and is very difficult to escape. In addition, the patriarchal system is often fuelled 
and sustained by state norms. Among the Lebanese, there is the feeling that, in order to be 
protected, it is necessary to remain within the (political and religious) community but also 
close to their own family. As a result, to go against such institutions and the rules they 
impose has a boomerang effect, especially for women. An interesting example is the family 
registration number, which is one of the primary forms of identification for a Lebanese 
citizen: This number, present in public/civil registers, is shared by members of the same 
family through the male line. In this system, women do not have autonomy: They are added 
to their spouse’s registration number when they marry and revert to their father’s number if 
they divorce. In such a system, women are strongly discriminated against: trying to get rid of 
the patriarchal system, they risk being banned from their community, which results in them 
remaining without protection and rights. In a society where community affiliation and family 
ties often count more than state membership, this marginalisation is a very serious problem, a 
social stigma.43  
 
This family/patriarchal/religious system is transversal to the 18 communities, and family and 
patriarchal bonds unite them in the struggle to maintain the status quo necessary to protect 
their prerogatives.44 The profound interweaving of political consociativism, confessionalism 
and social patriarchy represents a ubiquitous and very difficult barrier to overcome, 
particularly for women. 
 
4. Women’s Rights in the Shadow of a Penetrated Society 
 
At this point, in order to better understand the deep interweaving that we have described and 
its repercussions on women and their rights, it is necessary to consider a few examples. If, in 
fact, the Lebanese constitution guarantees the equality of all of the country’s citizens, it is in 
the specific rules of the communities and in some state laws that the major forms of 
discrimination take place.45 We will focus on two cases in particular: rules pertaining to the 
acquisition of citizenship and those concerning marriage/divorce. 
                                                
41  Interviews by the author conducted in Beirut in May and June 2017 with various women members of 
Christian and Muslim political parties; interview with a representative of the Municipality of Sinn al-Fīl, 
Sinn al-Fīl, 20 June 2017. 
42  Interview by the author a representative of the Katā’ib Party, Beirut, 17 June 2017; interview by the author 
with Lebanese leftist activist, Beirut, 14 June 2017. 
43  Interviews, May–June 2017.  
44  See Joseph, Suad. “Descent of the Nation: Kinship and Citizenship in Lebanon”. Citizenship Studies 3, 3 
(1999), p. 295-318, p. 299. 
45  Lebanon has signed the main international conventions on gender equality, including, in 1996, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Working 
groups have been monitoring the adaptation of the state’s rules to international conventions, and a number 
of NGOs work on raising awareness not only of the population but also of the judges and the judicial 
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An important point of discrimination for women is the transmission of citizenship. Article 6 
of the Lebanese constitution states: “Lebanese nationality and the manner in which it is 
acquired, retained and lost shall be determined according to the law.” National law assumes 
the transmission of citizenship according to the patrilineal principle: Whosoever is born to a 
Lebanese father is automatically considered Lebanese.46 As highlighted by Joseph, this law 
has fuelled the patriarchal and family system described above and created a series of serious 
problems and discrimination for women.47 According to the Act on the Transmission of 
Citizenship, Lebanese mothers cannot pass on their nationality to their children, while foreign 
women married to Lebanese spouses can obtain Lebanese nationality and can pass it on to 
their children from a previous marriage. Therefore, the Lebanese woman has even fewer 
rights than a foreign woman who marries a Lebanese man. For these reasons, Lebanese civil 
society has adhered to “Claiming Equal Citizenship: The Campaign for Arab Women’s Right 
to Nationality”, which lobbies for the recognition of maternal ius sanguinis.48 In addition, 
Lebanese women are subjected to further discrimination. According to the family number 
registration, when a child is born, it is placed in the family of the father, not of the mother, 
where it will remain for life. Therefore, if blood ties matter, it is the male ones that carry 
identities. In 2013, for example, a bill aimed at reforming the Law on Citizenship was 
rejected with the argument that if the norms of citizenship were changed in favour of 
Lebanese women, the marriage of Lebanese women with Palestinian refugees and the 
possibility to pass the Lebanese nationality to children born inside this union could affect the 
demographic balance between Christians and Muslims in favour of the latter.49 It is 
interesting to note that communitarian and confessional arguments to continue the 
discrimination against women were also been supported by Sunni Muslim groups, which, in 
principle, would have been favoured by the law: the bill was rejected unanimously by 
members of the ministerial committee tasked with studying it, which was composed 
proportionally of members of all communities.50  
                                                                                                                                                  
system more broadly. See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Consideration 
Of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention Fourth and Fifth Periodic 
Reports of States Parties due in 2014. Lebanon. UN Document CEDAW/C/LBN/4-5. In: 
http://nclw.org.lb/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CEDAW-Fourth-and-Fifth-Periodic-Report-Lebanon.pdf, 
PDF file (accessed 16 March 2018) 
46  The Lebanese Nationality law is regulated by Decree No. 15 on Lebanese Nationality of 19 January 1925. 
The law follows the principle of ius sanguinis and not of ius soli. Very little progress has been made since 
1925. See el-Khoury, Melkar; Jaulin, Thibaut. Country Report: Lebanon. Fiesole (FI), European 
University Institute, 2012. In: http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=countryProfiles&f=Lebanon.pdf, PDF file (accessed 30 October 2017). 
47  See Joseph. “Descent of the Nation”. Many Lebanese women are often unaware of the norms, and they 
understand the problems that the norms generate only when they touch their children. See Chamoun, 
Christine. “The Lebanese Nationality Law that Leaves Children Stateless”. Open Society Foundation, 11 
January 2017. In: https://goo.gl/CfrQ1V and Mandour, Sahar. “To Be the Daughter of a Lebanese 
Woman”. Heinrich Böll Stiftung-Middle East, 10 February 2016. In: https://goo.gl/Xm1o6B (both 
accessed 30 October 2017). 
48  See Women Learning Partnership for Rights, Development and Peace. “Claiming Equal Citizenship: The 
Campaign for Arab Women’s Right to Nationality”. 10 March 2006. In: https://goo.gl/YzE4J7 (accessed 
13 October 2017). 
49  See Alabaster, Olivia. “Activist: Rejection of Nationality Law Sets Dangerous Precedent”. The Daily Star, 
16 January 2013. In: https://goo.gl/Uq9qn1 (accessed 25 October 2017). 
50  See Moufarrege, Joumana; Karam, Fadi. “What is this “Higher Interest” that Prevents a Mother Passing 
her Nationality to her Children?” Heinrich Böll Stiftung-Middle East, 24 April 2013. In: 
https://goo.gl/V6eDQf (accessed 30 October 2017), and Meier, Daniel. “Matrimonial Strategies and 
Identity Relations between Palestinian Refugees and Lebanese after the Lebanese Civil War”. Journal of 
Refugee Studies, 23, 2 (2010), p. 111-133.  
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Legislation on the transmission of citizenship is closely related to the second aspect that we 
referred to in the opening, namely regulation by religious courts of the rules concerning the 
personal status code. In this field, women are particularly affected by the rules of marriage, 
divorce, alimony and child custody. Because religious leaders consider such areas to be 
“sensitive”, they have pushed the members of their community into intra-community 
marriages because in such marriages the transmission of citizenship, as well as membership 
and the management of inheritance-related practices, is easier to control.51 Obviously, norms 
are different from one community to another. While in the Catholic arena divorce is difficult 
to obtain because of the sacred and indissoluble character of the marriage bond, divorce is 
contemplated and regulated in all Sunni jurisprudence and among the Shiites.52 With respect 
to inheritance, Sunni women have, in practice, not been able to inherit from their fathers, 
while Christian women have.  
 
Although there are no written rules in this regard, in mixed marriages women must follow the 
religion of the husband, and the community/confessional identity is transmitted to the 
children according to patrilineal and non-matrilineal lines. In Muslim communities where 
conversion is considered apostasy, in the case of mixed marriages, it is still the man of 
another confession who is asked to convert to Islam. In this way, in line with the patriarchal 
idea that a woman must follow patrilineal rules, the woman is not allowed to convert and thus 
is prevented from renouncing her patrilineal name.53 The Catholic Church has accepted the 
possibility that believers marry a non-Christian, provided that the children who are born out 
of such a marriage are baptised and follow Christian rules.54 In the case of divorce, however, 
while Christian women retain the right to alimony, their Muslim counterparts do not. But if a 
Muslim woman converts to another religion, or a non-Muslim marries a Muslim, she is 
denied child custody in the case of divorce in both Shiite and Sunni Islam.55 Though different 
from community to community, similar rules favour patrilineal ties even when it comes to 
child custody, which creates abnormal situations in which the custody of children favours 
grandparents and aunts rather than mothers (for example, in the case of divorce). According 
to Muslim religious tribunals, in the case of divorce, Muslim women may take custody of 
their children in their first years of life before custody passes to their ex-husband and his 
family.56 This is certainly a strong disincentive to divorce, even in those contexts, such as the 
Muslim ones, that easily allow it. Similarly, a Muslim woman who marries after a divorce 
loses custody of her children (at issue is the “false father” – the new husband – who would 
otherwise “contaminate” the patrilineality).57  
 
                                                
51  See Joseph, Suad. “Working Class Women’s Networks in a Sectarian State: A Political Paradox”. 
American Ethnologist, 10, 1 (1983), p. 1-22. 
52  Saadeh, Sofia. “Basic Issues Concerning the Personal Status Laws in Lebanon”. In: Religion between 
Violence and Reconciliation. Thomas Scheffler (ed.), Würzburg, Ergon Verlag, 2002, p. 449-456.  
53  See Joseph. “Descent of the Nation”, p. 310. 
54  Kanafani-Zahar, Aida, “The Religion of the ‘Other’ as Bond: The Interreligious in Lebanon”. In: Religion 
between Violence and Reconciliation. Thomas Scheffler (ed.). Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2002, p. 401-418. 
55  Farha, Mark. “Stumbling Blocks to the Secularization of Personal Status Law in the Lebanese Republic 
(1926-2013)”. Arab Law Quarterly, 29 (2015), p. 31-55. 
56  After a long battle in 2011, the Sunni Supreme Council agreed to raise the age to 12 (the first was 6 for 
men and 9 for women). Activists demanded 13 and 15, but the result seems to be a success for an 
institution that had never before changed laws in favour of women’s rights. See Dabbous, Dima. Legal 
Reform and Women’s Rights in Lebanese Personal Status Laws, CMI Report, 2017. In: 
https://goo.gl/cv8FBy (accessed 23 October 2017). 
57  See Joseph, “Descent of the Nation”, p. 310.  
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The differentiation of treatment according to the different communities has led not only to a 
stiffening of the rules of each community but also to an undeclared coalition between 
communities that share a common goal: the defence of the status quo – a status quo that is 
particularly profitable. One of the reasons that led to the rejection of Hrawi’s civil marriage 
proposal in 1998 was that it would have affected the interests of religious communities. Both 
Christians and Muslims who officiate at a marriage receive more than $1,000 as an 
honorarium. Furthermore, the Sunni community, as a legacy of an Ottoman law, receives 
subsidies directly from the state, and the introduction of civil marriage could have altered this 




Women in Lebanon are subject to double discrimination: the lack of a unified civil code does 
not allow for the equality of women’s rights among women of different communities, and the 
absence of specific state laws to implement the constitutional dictates continues gender 
inequality. The first aspect is particularly significant: Lebanese women strive to fight for 
rights within their community but often find it difficult to undertake trans-communitarian 
actions. Members of the various associations working on women’s rights protection and 
awareness campaigns often do not know each other. The same is true of “mental” 
communitarian barriers and geographic specialisation: As Melanie Cammett has 
demonstrated regarding the case of welfare provision in Lebanon, it is difficult to think and 
operate trans-confessionally, especially for those working in specific geographic contexts that 
are confessionally dominated. The confessional/communitarian system is a sort of cage where 
more progressive activists are sometimes constrained. This weakens and slows down 
women’s demands, if it does not nullify them altogether.59  
 
The lack of a unified civil code continues to be one of the crucial points from which to start 
building a series of law proposals for the protection of women’s rights and their equality at 
the national level, independently of their religion. But the promulgation of laws in the 
direction of derogating Article 9 of the constitution could help. In the past 10 years, the work 
done by women’s associations has been extensive and widespread and has touched the issue 
of personal rights, as well as issues related to women’s political participation and political 
rights.60 Business associations, NGOs and activist associations have been working hard to 
achieve these goals. In a system such as the one in Lebanon, where the spaces for manoeuvre 
are so narrow, it is very difficult to produce concrete results. However, it should be stressed 
that this is not only a Lebanese problem: patriarchal power management systems prevent 
women from participating fully in social and political processes at every latitude.  
 
 
                                                
58  Farha. “Stumbling Blocks to the Secularization of Personal Status Law”. Not only the draft law of 1998 
but also the one from 2014 that had foreseen a form of compensation for religious courts.  
59  See. Civil Society Knowledge Center. “Gender Afterworks: The Long Road to Reforming Personal Status 
Laws in Lebanon”. 3 October 2017. In: https://goo.gl/A5NXKQ (accessed 16 March 2018).  
60  In this regard, the debate around instituting a female quota is interesting. See Hussein, Walid. “The 
‘Female Quota’ in Lebanon: A Temporary Solution to a Chronic Political Problem”. Heinrich Böll 
Stiftung-Middle East, 17 February 2017, https://goo.gl/11mkTA (accessed 20 October 2017). 
